Suchergebnisse

The Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR) of Birobidzhan in Siberia is still alive. The once famous "Siberian Zion", at the confluence of the Bira and Bidzhan rivers, a stone's throw away from China and a day from the Pacific Ocean, 9,000 km and six days by train from Moscow, is still a geographical reality. The political class of the Soviet Union decided to create a territory the size of Belgium for a settlement for Jews, choosing a region on the border between China and the Soviet Union. It believed that Soviet Jews needed, like other national minorities, a homeland with a territory. The Soviet regime thus opted to establish an enclave that would become the JAR in 1934. We should note that the creation of the JAR was the first historically fulfilled case of building an officially recognised Jewish national territory since antiquity and well before Israel. Nevertheless, many historians declared this experiment a failure and the history of the Region only tragic. It is interesting to note, however, that the survival of the JAR in post-Soviet Russia has been not only a historical curiosity, a legacy of Soviet national policy, but today – after the collapse of the Soviet Union – it represents a very interesting case study. It is also a topic useful for the analysis and understanding of inter-ethnic relations, cooperation, and coexistence and it is a unique case of geographic resettlement that produced a special case of "local patriotism", as an example also for different ethnic groups living in the JAR, based on Jewish and Yiddish roots.

The Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR) of Birobidzhan in Siberia is still alive. The once famous "Siberian Zion", at the confluence of the Bira and Bidzhan rivers, a stone's throw away from China and a day from the Pacific Ocean, 9,000 km and six days by train from Moscow, is still a geographical reality. The political class of the Soviet Union decided to create a territory the size of Belgium for a settlement for Jews, choosing a region on the border between China and the Soviet Union. It believed that Soviet Jews needed, like other national minorities, a homeland with a territory. The Soviet regime thus opted to establish an enclave that would become the JAR in 1934. We should note that the creation of the JAR was the first historically fulfilled case of building an officially recognised Jewish national territory since antiquity and well before Israel. Nevertheless, many historians declared this experiment a failure and the history of the Region only tragic. It is interesting to note, however, that the survival of the JAR in post-Soviet Russia has been not only a historical curiosity, a legacy of Soviet national policy, but today – after the collapse of the Soviet Union – it represents a very interesting case study. It is also a topic useful for the analysis and understanding of inter-ethnic relations, cooperation, and coexistence and it is a unique case of geographic resettlement that produced a special case of "local patriotism", as an example also for different ethnic groups living in the JAR, based on Jewish and Yiddish roots.

After the end of the bipolar world, the possibility of an East–West mass migration becamea new issue that took root in the Italian consciousness in forms masked by the feelings of the threatof an imminent "mass invasion" from Central and Eastern Europe. This new fear stimulated restrictivemeasures belatedly adopted in Italy and created a de facto unjust and imbalanced condition fornew migrants from Eastern Europe because the first South–North migrations' wave had alreadyoccurred when the regimes of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed.There are many evident similarities between the beliefs, attitudes and the use of insecurity (not basedon data) of the 1990s and the current Italian migration policy. What they have in common is the incorrectperception and the misuse of it by politicians and propagandists. Immigration from EasternEurope continues to be compared to that from the South of the world and Asia which continues tobe interpreted without considering their real natures and the actual trends that characterise them.According to new studies that compared survey results with population data, contemporary Italiansoverestimate the number of immigrants coming from outside the EU to their country more than anyother Europeans. As a result, the misuse or ignorance of the data on migrations is particularly dangerousbecause the devaluation of them has critical implications for policymaking.

After the end of the bipolar world, the possibility of an East–West mass migration became a new issue that took root in the Italian consciousness in forms masked by the feelings of the threat of an imminent "mass invasion" from Central and Eastern Europe. This new fear stimulated restrictive measures belatedly adopted in Italy and created a de facto unjust and imbalanced condition for new migrants from Eastern Europe because the first South–North migrations' wave had already occurred when the regimes of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed. There are many evident similarities between the beliefs, attitudes and the use of insecurity (not based on data) of the 1990s and the current Italian migration policy. What they have in common is the incorrect perception and the misuse of it by politicians and propagandists. Immigration from Eastern Europe continues to be compared to that from the South of the world and Asia which continues to be interpreted without considering their real natures and the actual trends that characterise them. According to new studies that compared survey results with population data, contemporary Italians overestimate the number of immigrants coming from outside the EU to their country more than any other Europeans. As a result, the misuse or ignorance of the data on migrations is particularly dangerous because the devaluation of them has critical implications for policymaking.

The European spatial development policy discourse has recently taken a "territorial" character, especially after the migrant crisis. Even if the terminology regarding this policy field remains ambiguous, territory, or territoriality, has become de facto an increasingly prevalent notion in the discourse on the organization of "European" (i.e. EU's) space. In fact, the notion of territoriality and the prevalent "territorial" discourse produced an evident eclipse of the widespread notion of "European space" that had been developed in the early 1990s. Basically, the spatial predominant conception of the EU contributes to an emergence of a sharpened territorial building of the European space. The idea of both territorial cohesion and territorial continuity provides re­levant insights into the notion of territoriality in the "European discourse" and consequently clearly shows how are accepted the tools of hard bordering (as policies and practices) and the sharp inside/outside dichotomy, typical of a "Westphalian memory" and of an use of territory as support for a unified political unit. Due to this pragmatic notion of territoriality, the idea of the EU as a "non-Westphalian new empire", characterized by softening of borders and sharing of political power across multiple and multilevel politics, became at least unrealistic. On the contrary, Europe has always been distinguished by its openness to the rest of the world. It has never been a clearly demarcated continent or a fixed bordered entity and it has always been characterized by shifting spatialities of politics. The Middle Ages in Europe were characterized by overlapping, divided authority structures and often contentious jurisdictions, without territorial containments and a clear notion of the border. The comprehension of the transnational dimension opens new avenues of research and offers new modes of understanding.

The European spatial development policy discourse has recently taken a "territorial" character, especially after the migrant crisis. Even if the terminology regarding this policy field remains ambiguous, territory, or territoriality, has become de facto an increasingly prevalent notion in the discourse on the organization of "European" (i.e. EU's) space. In fact, the notion of territoriality and the prevalent "territorial" discourse produced an evident eclipse of the widespread notion of "European space" that had been developed in the early 1990s. Basically, the spatial predominant conception of the EU contributes to an emergence of a sharpened territorial building of the European space. The idea of both territorial cohesion and territorial continuity provides re­levant insights into the notion of territoriality in the "European discourse" and consequently clearly shows how are accepted the tools of hard bordering (as policies and practices) and the sharp inside/outside dichotomy, typical of a "Westphalian memory" and of an use of territory as support for a unified political unit. Due to this pragmatic notion of territoriality, the idea of the EU as a "non-Westphalian new empire", characterized by softening of borders and sharing of political power across multiple and multilevel politics, became at least unrealistic. On the contrary, Europe has always been distinguished by its openness to the rest of the world. It has never been a clearly demarcated continent or a fixed bordered entity and it has always been characterized by shifting spatialities of politics. The Middle Ages in Europe were characterized by overlapping, divided authority structures and often contentious jurisdictions, without territorial containments and a clear notion of the border. The comprehension of the transnational dimension opens new avenues of research and offers new modes of understanding. ; Dyskurs nad polityką zagospodarowania przestrzennego w Unii Europejskiej nabrał ostatnio charakteru "terytorialnego", zwłaszcza po kryzysie migracyjnym. Mimo, iż terminologia dotycząca tej dziedziny polityki bywa niejednoznaczna, to pojęcia terytorium oraz terytorialności są de facto coraz bardziej powszechne w dyskursie nad organizacją przestrzeni europejskiej (czyli UE). W rzeczywistości pojęcie terytorialności wyraźnie przyćmiło powszechne pojęcie "przestrzeni europejskiej", które zostało opracowane na początku lat 90. ubiegłego stulecia. Zasadniczo dominująca koncepcja przestrzenna UE przyczynia się do zaostrzenia budowy terytorialnej przestrzeni europejskiej. Zarówno idea spójności terytorialnej, jak i ciągłości terytorialnej zapewnia odpowiedni wgląd w pojęcie terytorialności w ramach "dyskursu europejskiego", a co za tym idzie wyraźnie pokazuje stopień akceptacji narzędzi rozgraniczających (w ramach polityki i praktyki), a także ostrą dychotomię wewnętrzną/zewnętrzną oraz wykorzystanie terytorium jako elementu wsparcia dla zunifikowanej jednostki politycznej. W związku z tym pragmatycznym pojęciem terytorialności, wizja Unii Europejskiej jako "nowego imperium", charakteryzującego się zmiękczeniem granic i podziałem władzy politycznej pomiędzy wieloma wielopoziomowymi politykami, stała się co najmniej nierealna. Z drugiej strony Europa zawsze wyróżniała się otwartością na pozostałą część świata. Nigdy też nie była wyraźnie odgraniczonym kontynentem lub wydzieloną stałą granicą całością i zawsze charakteryzowała się przesunięciami przestrzeni politycznych. Średniowiecze w Europie charakteryzowało się nachodzeniem na siebie podzielonych struktur władzy i często kontrowersyjnych jurysdykcji, bez obudowy terytorialnej i jasnego pojęcia granicy. Dostrzeżenie wymiaru ponadnarodowego otwiera nowe możliwości badawcze i oferuje nowe sposoby pojmowania problemu.

It would be a mistake to assume that ethnopolitics is only a matter of confrontation between different ethnic groups. On the contrary, there is a range of examples where it is pursued in a spirit of compromise and co‑operation. One of them is the case of the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan, in Post‑Soviet Russia. Often ethnic groups realize that co‑operation and cultural coexistence are more profitable than conflict. Beginning in 1928 the Soviet Union set aside a territory the size of Belgium for Jewish settlement, located some five thousands miles east of Moscow along the Soviet‑Chinese border. Believing that Soviet Jewish people, like other national minorities, deserved a territorial homeland, the regime decided to settle an enclave that would become the Jewish Autonomous Region in 1934. In fact, the establishment of the JAR was the first instance of an officially acknowledged Jewish national territory since ancient times. But the history of the Region was tragic and the experiment failed dismally. Nevertheless, Birobidzhan's renewed existence of today is not only a curious legacy of Soviet national policy, but after the break‑up of the Soviet Union and the definite religious rebirth, represents an interesting case‑study in respect to interethnic relations.

The predominant spatial conception of the EU contributes to an evident emergence of a sharpened territorial building of the European space. By all evidence the idea of both the territorial cohesion and territorial continuity shows how relevant the notion of territoriality in the 'European discourse' is and consequently how accepted the instrument of hard and closed border and the sharp inside/outside dichotomy are. Due to this pragmatic notion of territoriality, the idea of the EU as a 'non-Westphalian new empire' (according to the 'neo-medieval paradigm') became at least unrealistic. Its borders are getting more territorial, physical and visible. Hard border policies and practices on the Eastern and Western Balkan borders mirror the existence of a de facto barrier and of a deep 'Westphalian memory' in the way of using the territory as support of political unity.